Author: Emmanuel Ruchat

The final session of the 2026 AILA/GMS Global Migration Forum asked why migration systems are drifting away from harmonisation and toward re-nationalisation. That question captures one of the central tensions of contemporary migration policy. Migration is not disappearing as a global phenomenon. It is being reclassified by states as a national risk to control, and as an economic resource to select. Emmanuel Ruchat at AILA AC26 in San Diego, CA, on 16 June 2026 Three forces help explain this movement: the contraction of development and humanitarian aid, the rise of popular votes and electoral mandates on immigration, and the growing preference for selected migration through talent, skills and shortage-occupation routes. France, the European Union, Belgium, Switzerland and the United States all illustrate different versions of the same broader transformation. Development aid is shrinking, and migration pressure is moving downstream Migration policy cannot be separated from Official Development Assistance, or ODA. When development and humanitarian budgets are reduced, the effects are not confined to aid programmes. They are displaced onto borders, asylum systems, informal routes, reception systems and courts. Recent OECD data show a historic contraction in development aid. ODA by DAC members and associates fell to around USD 174.3 billion in 2025, representing 0.26% of combined GNI, a real-terms decline of about 23% from 2024. The cuts hit precisely the regions most connected to forced or constrained mobility: Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and least-developed countries. Humanitarian aid also fell sharply. France is part of that trend. It remains a major donor, but its ODA has declined. This matters politically because European states are increasing pressure on migration control while reducing some of the instruments that stabilise countries of origin, transit and first reception. The contradiction is simple. Europe wants fewer irregular arrivals, but it is cutting part of the financial architecture that helps reduce forced movement before it reaches Europe. Popular votes are turning immigration into a sovereignty test The second driver is democratic pressure. Immigration is increasingly submitted to direct or quasi-direct popular judgement: referendums, popular initiatives, European elections and national elections that operate as de facto referendums on immigration. These votes do not merely reflect anxiety; they produce policy. Brexit remains the clearest European precedent. In 2016, Leave won with 51.9% against 48.1%, on turnout of 72.2%. The referendum transformed free movement from a technical feature of EU membership into a test of sovereignty. “Take back control” became the political grammar of migration re-nationalisation. Switzerland is the laboratory of this dynamic. In 2014, the popular initiative “against mass immigration” passed by 50.3% to 49.7%, forcing Switzerland to reconcile a domestic democratic mandate with its relationship to EU free movement. More recently, in June 2026, Swiss voters rejected the SVP’s “No to a Switzerland with 10 million” initiative by roughly 55% to 45%. The initiative failed, but its political significance remains substantial. It would have capped the population at 10 million and, if the threshold were exceeded, could have forced Switzerland to terminate agreements including the EU free-movement agreement. France shows the same mechanism through elections rather than referendums. Immigration, security and national control have become central themes of electoral mobilisation. European and legislative elections increasingly operate as indirect votes on whether the state is seen as controlling entry, residence, integration and removal. That dynamic pushes even centrist governments toward visible measures of control. There is also a paradox that is often overlooked: immigrant-origin communities are not automatically pro-immigration constituencies. British ethnic-minority Leave voters, for example, often distinguished their own family histories from those of newer migrants and could support restriction while seeing themselves as successful examples of integration. That paradox matters because it weakens a common assumption in migration politics: demographic diversity does not automatically generate a stable pro-immigration majority. Once established, naturalised or socially integrated, some groups may support restrictive policies if they perceive new migration as a threat to employment, housing, public services, identity or social recognition. The political answer is not zero immigration; it is selected immigration The third driver is economic. States are not simply closing migration channels. They are redesigning them. The emerging compromise is to restrict asylum, family migration, regularisation and irregular routes, while facilitating entry for workers, researchers, doctors, engineers, entrepreneurs, investors and shortage occupations. France’s law of 26 January 2024 “to control immigration and improve integration” is a good illustration. It facilitates removal in cases involving serious offences, strengthens integration and language requirements, creates a temporary regularisation pathway for undocumented workers in shortage occupations, and reforms the Talent residence permit. The political message is not “no immigration”. It is controlled immigration, conditional integration and selected labour migration. The French Talent card is central to this evolution. It can be issued for up to four years and targets categories such as qualified employees, researchers, entrepreneurs, investors, corporate officers, artists, internationally recognised profiles and medical or pharmaceutical professionals. It is presented as an instrument of economic attractiveness. The numbers show the direction of travel. In 2024, France issued more than 340,000 first residence permits to third-country nationals, including more than 58,000 for economic reasons. That is more than triple the number of economic permits issued in 2011. The share remains smaller than family, student or humanitarian migration, but it is politically central because it fits the new language of usefulness, contribution and selection. At EU level, the same trend appears through the EU Blue Card and the EU Talent Pool. In 2023, around 89,000 EU Blue Cards were issued to highly qualified non-EU workers. But the distribution shows how fragmented the supposedly European instrument remains: Germany issued about 69,000, around 78% of the total, while France issued about 4,000. The EU Talent Pool confirms the same logic. It is designed as an EU-wide platform to facilitate international recruitment of jobseekers from outside Europe, especially for shortage occupations. But this is not harmonisation in the old sense. It is European coordination around national selection. The EU builds tools, but Member States retain decisive control over admission, labour-market needs and political acceptability. Belgium: stricter

The Belgian special tax regime for inbound taxpayers has been made more accessible and more attractive. The minimum gross annual remuneration required under the RSII has been reduced from EUR 75,000 to EUR 70,000, while the maximum tax-free lump-sum allowance for employer-related expenses has been increased from 30% to 35% of gross annual remuneration. The previous annual cap of EUR 90,000 has also been removed. In practice, these changes should broaden access to the regime and may significantly reduce employment costs when hiring international talent, while giving multinational groups more flexibility to structure competitive remuneration packages. These changes apply to remuneration paid or granted as from 1 January 2025. Because the new rules apply retroactively, a specific transitional regime is available for impatriate taxpayers who started working in Belgium on or after that date and who did not meet the former EUR 75,000 salary threshold, but who satisfy all other conditions and meet the new EUR 70,000 threshold. These individuals may still apply for the regime, provided the application is filed within three months from the tenth day following publication of the law in the Belgian Official Gazette. The RSII is available to employees and company directors who meet several cumulative conditions. The individual must work in Belgium either after being recruited directly from abroad or after being assigned to a Belgian entity by a foreign company belonging to the same multinational group. The taxable gross annual remuneration in Belgium must amount to at least EUR 70,000. In addition, during the 60 months preceding the start of employment in Belgium, the individual must not have been a Belgian tax resident, must not have been subject to Belgian income tax, and must not have lived within 150 kilometres of the Belgian border. The employer must file the application within three months of the start of employment. The regime can apply for a maximum period of five years, with a possible three-year extension. A separate special tax regime also exists for inbound researchers, the RSICI. This regime applies to employees working as researchers who hold a qualifying degree and/or have at least ten years of relevant professional experience. They must work in a laboratory or company carrying out one or more research and development programmes, and at least 80% of their working time must be effectively dedicated to research activities. The main conditions are broadly similar to those of the RSII, but no minimum remuneration threshold applies and the regime is only available to employees. Under both regimes, employers may grant a tax-exempt allowance for recurring expenses directly linked to the assignment or employment in Belgium, capped at 35% of gross remuneration. Certain exceptional expenses, such as relocation costs, housing setup costs in Belgium and children’s school fees, may also be reimbursed tax-free. In principle, these allowances are also exempt from employee and employer social security contributions, although it remains to be confirmed whether the Belgian social security authorities will accept the increase to 35% and the removal of the previous maximum cap.

  Over the last few years, French immigration and nationality law has been reshaped in stages: first by the Act of 26 January 2024, then by a series of circulars, decrees and a ministerial order adopted in 2025. Taken together, these texts both harden day-to-day administrative practice (from 2025) and create a major legal “step change” on 1 January 2026, when a formal civic exam and higher language requirements will become unavoidable for many residence and nationality procedures. Lexial is implementing a training program enabling candidates for professional immigration to meet the challenges arising from the new rules (more information will be available soon on this website). 1. The 23 January 2025 circular on “admission exceptionnelle au séjour” (AES) The Interior Ministry circular of 23 January 2025 on admission exceptionnelle au séjour immediately reframes exceptional regularisation as a strictly residual mechanism and not a parallel route to ordinary residence permits. It insists that AES should only be used where no ordinary legal path is available and raises the bar for “integration”, including a strong focus on French language skills and a new requirement to sign a “contract of commitment to respect the principles of the Republic”, with non-signature treated as an inadmissible file. It also encourages prefectures to give more weight to public-order considerations and to the non-execution of removal orders, pointing out that an unexecuted OQTF can justify refusing even an ordinary temporary card. The circular thus tightens regularisation practice right away, without waiting for 2026, and significantly narrows the scope and predictability of AES for people in an irregular situation. 2. The 2 May 2025 circular on naturalisation practice The circular of 2 May 2025 on the instruction of naturalisation files also has immediate effect and confirms that naturalisation is a discretionary “favour” rather than a right. It instructs prefectures to adopt a more exacting interpretation of “assimilation”, with stricter scrutiny of criminal records, respect for immigration rules and economic autonomy. It anticipates the forthcoming elevation of the required French level from B1 to B2 and the introduction of a formal civic exam, indicating that these new criteria will apply no later than 1 January 2026, but already encourages a demanding approach to language and integration in the meantime. In practice, the circular makes naturalisation harder from 2025 onward, even before the higher B2 threshold and the civic exam are legally in force. 3. The 15 July 2025 decree on residence permits Decree no. 2025-647 of 15 July 2025 is one of the key implementing texts of the 26 January 2024 Act in the field of residence. It rewrites the conditions of “republican integration” for long-term statuses by requiring proof of A2-level French for a first multi-annual residence card and B1-level French for a first resident card, in both cases through recognised diplomas or certifications. It also ties the resident card to successful completion of the new civic exam, which becomes a formal condition for obtaining this more secure status. Crucially, the decree provides that these new requirements will only apply from 1 January 2026. Until 31 December 2025, first-time applications for multi-annual or resident cards should still be examined under the previous regime, in which the integration requirement was more loosely assessed and no civic exam had yet been introduced. 4. The 15 July 2025 decree on the acquisition of nationality A companion decree, no. 2025-648 of 15 July 2025, deals with the acquisition of French nationality, whether by naturalisation or, in certain cases, by declaration (for example as the spouse of a French national). It raises the linguistic requirement from B1 to B2 in both oral and written French, and it replaces the former model centred on an “assimilation interview” with a system in which candidates must pass the civic exam and provide a formal attestation of success in their file. Like the residence-permit decree, it sets 1 January 2026 as the date on which these conditions become mandatory. This means that files that are complete and receivable before the end of 2025 should, in principle, still be assessed under the older, less demanding framework of B1-level French and a more flexible interview-based assessment of civic knowledge. 5. The 10 October 2025 order on the content and organisation of the civic exam The ministerial order of 10 October 2025 on the programme, tests and organisation of the civic exam operationalises what the July decrees had announced in principle. It defines a single exam which can carry different mentions depending on the procedure (“multi-annual residence card”, “resident card”, “naturalisation”), and specifies that it takes the form of a multiple-choice questionnaire of forty questions based on a detailed syllabus covering the principles and symbols of the Republic, institutions, rights and duties, everyday life in France and France’s place in Europe and the world. The passing threshold is fixed at 80% correct answers, and the test is designed to be taken in a standardised digital format. Although the order itself is adopted in October 2025, it is clearly aligned with the entry into force of the July decrees on 1 January 2026, at which point the civic exam becomes a de facto gateway for long-term residence and nationality. 6. A cumulative tightening – and the importance of the 31 December 2025 deadline Seen together, these texts create a cumulative tightening of both law and practice. From early 2025, the two circulars already make access to exceptional regularisation and to naturalisation more restrictive, by narrowing the scope of AES, hardening the assessment of behaviour, regularity of stay and economic autonomy, and encouraging a more rigorous reading of “assimilation”. On 1 January 2026, the two July decrees and the October order then transform this stricter practice into binding legal thresholds, with higher language levels (A2 for multi-annual cards, B1 for resident cards, B2 for nationality) and a formal civic exam that must be passed and evidenced by an attestation. For migrants who are already eligible under the current framework, this sequencing creates a clear time horizon: lodging a complete, receivable

Supported by growth in the construction and services sectors, Belgium’s GDP rose by 1.1% year-over-year (seasonally and calendar adjusted).The 2025–2029 Federal Coalition Agreement aims to “ensure the long-term economic competitiveness of the country by attracting talent and skills.” The key guidelines of this new policy can be summarized as follows: Revision of shortage occupation listsEach region (Flanders, Wallonia, Brussels) updates its sector-specific lists of high-demand occupations, allowing for expedited admission of qualified foreign workers in areas such as healthcare, construction, ICT, transport, etc. Simplified single permitThe issuance of the single permit (work + residence) is accelerated for qualified profiles, with reduced processing times and less stringent requirements (e.g., relevant work experience instead of a formal degree). Qualified immigration from outside the EUEmphasis is placed on cooperation with third countries to attract skilled workers from outside the EU, through bilateral agreements inspired by the Canadian model. Reduction of administrative barriers for businessesAdministrative relief is planned for employers seeking to recruit foreign talent: digital one-stop shops, lighter documentation requirements, and streamlined group applications in specific sectors. Focus on retaining international talentThe objective is not only to attract talent but to retain it: easier access to permanent residence for foreign workers, facilitated family reunification for highly qualified profiles, and priority access to continuing education. The expected economic impact should be significant. In addition to reducing labor market tensions in chronically understaffed sectors, there will be productivity gains for businesses and increased fiscal contributions from new workers. The financing of social security will be sustained through a broader base of contributors.

According to the 2025 EY Attractiveness Survey, France has retained its position as the most attractive country in Europe for foreign investment for the sixth consecutive year. France led Europe with 1,025 foreign investment projects in 2024, ahead of the UK (853) and Germany (608), despite a 14% drop in project numbers. It captured 19% of all foreign investments destined for Europe, slightly more than in 2019. France was the top destination for industrial investment, with 415 manufacturing projects—more than one-quarter of all such projects in Europe. It also led in research and development (R&D), with 104 projects, thanks to initiatives like the “France 2030” plan, which supports innovation in sectors like AI and quantum technologies. Regional attractiveness improved, with 75% of projects located outside the Paris region, showing balanced national development. Despite a general decline in foreign direct investment across Europe due to economic uncertainty, high energy prices, and geopolitical tensions, France’s proactive industrial policies, skilled workforce, and innovation ecosystem helped it maintain its lead.   In this context, France implemented several legislative, regulatory, and practical changes in immigration policy. These updates primarily focus on exceptional admission to residence, residence permits, employment conditions for foreigners, and procedures relating to asylum and integration. The circular issued on January 23, 2025, prioritizes exceptional residence permits for foreign workers employed in occupations and regions facing labor shortages. The criteria for regularization have become stricter, requiring applicants to demonstrate at least seven years of residence in France—up from five years previously—as a clear indicator of integration. Foreigners subject to recent return bans (IRTF) or obligations to leave French territory (OQTF) are generally excluded from the procedure, unless new information warrants reconsideration. At the same time, the 2025 circular eliminates previous regularization criteria from 2012, such as temporary employment situations or short-term contracts, leaving prefectures with fewer specific guidelines to evaluate individual cases. Regarding residence permits and integration, Law No. 2024-42, effective since January 26, 2024, introduces a “Republican Engagement Contract.” Foreigners seeking residence permits must commit explicitly to respect republican principles. Failure or refusal to sign or adhere to this contract may lead to denial or withdrawal of the residence permit. Additionally, the previously named “Passeport Talent” residence permit has been simplified and renamed the “Talent” permit, consolidating several categories for clarity. Employment conditions for foreigners have also become stricter since September 1, 2024. Authorities now thoroughly assess employers’ compliance with social obligations and their criminal records before granting work authorizations. Employers must demonstrate that recruitment plans are proportionate to their economic activities. Furthermore, a new requirement mandates that employers ensure decent housing for seasonal foreign workers throughout their stay. The asylum application process has been streamlined with the establishment of territorial “France Asylum” centers, enabling asylum seekers to complete all necessary steps—registration, rights activation, and filing of applications—in a single location. This reorganization aims to significantly reduce processing delays. Additionally, proficiency in French and adherence to republican values remain central requirements, reinforced under the updated Republican Integration Contract (CIR). Finally, sanctions against employers exploiting unauthorized foreign workers have been significantly strengthened. Law No. 2024-42 doubles applicable fines, which can reach up to €30,000—or €200,000 if violations involve organized criminal groups—and converts the special contribution into an administrative fine. Overall, the 2025 immigration reforms aim to balance tighter control of immigration flows with improved integration through employment and language acquisition for legally residing foreigners. However, stricter criteria for regularization and residence permits may limit access for certain groups. These changes reflect an approach focused on more restrictive immigration policies while addressing labor shortages in critical sectors.   Upcoming Changes to French Naturalization Requirements – Effective January 1, 2026 In May, a new draft circular from French Minister of the Interior, Mr. Bruno Retailleau, outlines significantly stricter requirements for foreign nationals seeking French nationality. These changes will take effect on January 1, 2026, and are intended to reinforce integration standards and ensure applicants maintain a strong, demonstrable connection to France. Key Measures to Be Aware Of: Strengthened Language and Civic Requirements (Effective January 1, 2026): Applicants will be required to demonstrate a higher level of French language proficiency. In addition, a mandatory civic exam covering the values and principles of the French Republic will be introduced as part of the naturalization process, specifically for first-time applicants for multi-year residence cards or permanent residency. Demonstrated Assimilation: Candidates must show clear assimilation into French society and a sincere adherence to the Republic’s core values. This includes respectful behavior, especially regarding French laws on entry, stay, and residence. Clean Legal Record and Conduct: Individuals with convictions for terrorism or any non-suspended prison sentence of six months or more will remain ineligible. The authorities may reject applications based on reports of problematic or inappropriate conduct. In less severe cases, a postponement of the application may be considered. Immigration Compliance: Applications will be automatically deemed inadmissible if the applicant is in irregular status, has been the subject of an unresolved deportation order, or is under a still-active exclusion from French territory. Stricter Financial and Employment Criteria: Applicants must demonstrate financial independence over a five-year period, excluding reliance on French social benefits. Priority will be given to those with stable, sufficient income earned in France. Applications from individuals whose primary income comes from abroad may be denied, as this suggests their primary ties remain outside France. Longer Processing Times Expected: Due to rising volumes, the government anticipates the backlog of applications could exceed 290,000 cases by the end of 2025, resulting in average processing delays of more than 28 months. While the legal framework for naturalization is unchanged, the practical conditions for success are being significantly tightened. Anyone considering applying for French nationality should take steps now to ensure they will meet the more demanding requirements coming into force on January 1, 2026.

The exceptional admission for residence is a discretionary procedure outlined in Articles L. 435-1 to L. 435-4 of the CESEDA, which allows the prefect to grant residence to a foreigner outside the typical legal provisions. Article L. 435-1 specifies that foreigners whose admission is based on humanitarian considerations or exceptional circumstances can obtain residence permits such as “employee,” “temporary worker,” or “private and family life” depending on the reasons presented. The November 28, 2012, “Valls Circular” established guidelines for this process, clarifying what constitutes “humanitarian considerations” or “exceptional reasons,” including references to irregular employment. This procedure generally requires a minimum stay of five years in France and employment for eight months, with employers needing to submit a work authorization form. In response to labor shortages, the 2023 government bill sought to extend exceptional admission to more foreigners. Though initially removed by the Senate, the procedure was reintroduced through Article L. 435-4 of CESEDA. This allows foreigners who have worked in sectors facing recruitment challenges for at least 12 months within the past two years and who have resided in France for at least three years to receive a one-year “temporary worker” or “employee” residence permit. A February 5, 2024 circular clarified the implementation of this new system, which only applies to foreigners working in sectors with labor shortages. It excludes certain residency periods, such as those covered by “seasonal worker” or “student” permits. The law emphasizes that the permit is issued on an exceptional basis, taking into account not only professional activity but also social and familial integration, adherence to public order, and alignment with French societal values. This new provision supplements existing exceptional admission possibilities, such as those described in Article L. 435-1, which also permits residence for temporary or regular workers but requires an employer’s work authorization form. 4o

The European Union has introduced Directive 2024/1233 (24 April 2024), which marks a significant step forward in simplifying and harmonizing the procedures for third-country nationals to reside and work in EU member states. This directive aims to streamline the process, enhance workers’ rights, and ensure equitable treatment across the Union. Here’s a comprehensive overview of the key innovations and principles introduced by the directive: Unified Application Procedure One of the most notable advancements is the establishment of a unified application procedure. This process allows third-country nationals to apply for a single permit that authorizes both residency and employment within a member state. This simplification significantly reduces the administrative burden for both workers and employers, cutting down on processing times and bureaucratic hurdles. Common Set of Rights Directive 2024/1233 sets a common foundation of rights for third-country workers, ensuring they receive the same treatment as nationals of the host member state in various critical areas. These include employment conditions, wages, social security, and access to public and private goods and services. This harmonization is designed to enhance the integration and protection of migrant workers, ensuring they can contribute effectively to their host countries’ economies. Harmonization Across Member States By standardizing the rules and procedures for issuing single permits across the EU, the directive aims to reduce the discrepancies between national systems. This uniformity facilitates the mobility of workers within the EU and increases the transparency and predictability of the application process. Improved Access to Information The directive mandates that member states provide clear and accessible information on the requirements for entry and stay, rights and obligations, and necessary documentation for permit applications. This initiative ensures that both third-country nationals and employers are well-informed and can navigate the administrative processes more effectively. Flexibility to Change Employers The directive grants permit holders the right to change employers during the validity of their single permit, subject to certain conditions. This flexibility is crucial for allowing workers to seek better employment opportunities without restarting the entire application process, thus fostering a more dynamic labor market. Protection Against Exploitation In cases of abusive working conditions, the directive empowers member states to extend the authorized unemployment period for single permit holders. This provision enhances protection against exploitation and abuse by employers, providing a safety net for vulnerable workers. Sanctions and Legal Recourse To ensure compliance, the directive includes provisions for effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions against employers who violate the regulations. It also establishes mechanisms for workers to lodge complaints and seek legal redress directly or through third parties, ensuring their rights are upheld.

In 2023, France was recognized as the most attractive country in Europe for foreign investors for the fifth consecutive year, surpassing both the United Kingdom and Germany (EY, May 1st, 2024). Despite a slight decline in the number of foreign investment projects, down 5% from the previous year to 1,194, the investment levels remained robust, similar to those observed in 2019, before the global health crisis. These investments resulted in the creation of 39,773 jobs throughout the country. The enduring attractiveness of France is largely attributed to substantial reforms implemented over the past decade, including changes to the labor code, reductions in corporate and capital taxes, and significant decreases in production taxes. These measures, complemented by strategic investment plans such as France Relance and France 2030, have markedly improved France’s business environment. According to a study, these reforms have made France’s economic model more competitive and attractive than it was prior to 2017. Despite these positives, the study revealed several areas of concern. One significant issue is France’s struggle to attract new greenfield investments, with existing site expansions making up a large proportion of the investment projects. In contrast, new site investments are more common in the UK and Germany. Moreover, the average number of jobs created per investment project in France is considerably lower than in neighboring countries, pointing to potential inefficiencies or different economic focuses. Investor concerns extend to the financing of enterprises, cost competitiveness, and taxation, with the high cost of energy emerging as a new significant disadvantage. The previous year’s extensive strikes related to pension reforms also tarnished France’s image regarding social stability. The study suggests that while France has made significant advancements, its future attractiveness may hinge on addressing these emerging and persistent challenges. The country is at a pivotal moment, needing to sustain momentum from post-pandemic recovery efforts and to continue adapting to maintain its lead in an increasingly competitive global environment.

In its January 18, 2024 decision in Allée v. France, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that France violated the freedom of expression by wrongly convicting someone who had accused colleagues of harassment without adequate proof, under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Additionally, the European Parliament and Council’s Directive (EU) 2024/1069, issued on April 11, 2024, and published on April 16, 2024, protects public discourse participants from baseless legal actions and abusive lawsuits, known as “strategic lawsuits against public participation” (SLAPP).In the Allée v. France case decided on January 18, 2024, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that France violated the freedom of expression by convicting an individual who, without sufficient proof, accused colleagues of harassment. This decision came shortly before the European Union Directive 2024/1069 was published, aimed at protecting public discourse participants from baseless legal claims and abusive legal procedures, known as “strategic lawsuits against public participation” (SLAPP). The case involved a secretary who felt harassed by her executive vice-president and eventually sent an accusatory email about him, leading to her and her husband being sued for public defamation. The French courts initially found the email to be public and defamatory, dismissing her defense that the email was private and that she had a right to report workplace offenses. However, the ECHR disagreed, highlighting that the distribution of the email was limited and criticizing the excessive proof burden required by French courts, which overlooked the challenges of proving harassment. The ECHR’s decision raised concerns about possibly encouraging defamation by lowering the threshold for accountability in serious accusations without solid grounds. It suggests a potential shift in the legal landscape where freedom of expression could be used to shield false accusations, creating a complex legal scenario where defamation might be more easily excused under the guise of free speech. This verdict aligns with the EU Directive aimed at protecting individuals from SLAPP, emphasizing rapid judicial assessment of claims’ validity to prevent misuse of the legal system to stifle public discourse. However, the directive also includes provisions like requiring plaintiffs to deposit a security to cover procedural costs, potentially discouraging frivolous lawsuits but also risking the limitation of access to justice. Overall, these developments reflect a tension between enhancing freedom of expression and ensuring that this freedom does not facilitate the spread of misinformation or unwarranted attacks on individuals’ reputations, presenting a significant challenge in balancing these competing interests in the evolving landscape of European and international law.

The law of January 26, 2024, titled “Law to Control Immigration, Improve Integration,” introduces various measures to address immigration, integration, and asylum issues in France.   1. Foreign Workers: Workers in high-demand jobs (construction, home care, hospitality) without proper documentation can exceptionally receive a “temporary worker” or “employee” residence permit. These individuals are no longer required to go through their employer for this permit but must demonstrate at least 12 months of work in the past 24 months, 3 years of residence in France, and integration into French society. Prefects have discretionary power to grant these permits, with this measure being experimental until the end of 2026. A new four-year “talent – medical and pharmacy profession” residence permit is introduced for doctors, dentists, midwives, and pharmacists who graduated outside the European Union. “Talent” residence permits for skilled workers and project leaders are simplified. Access to self-employed status for “platform workers” is conditioned on having a work permit for this status. Sanctions against companies employing undocumented workers are strengthened.   2. Integration and Residence Permits: Employers’ obligations to provide French language training to their foreign employees are strengthened. Foreign victims of “slum landlords” who have filed a complaint will receive a residence permit for the duration of the legal process. New grounds are created for refusing to issue, renew, or withdraw temporary residence permits, including document fraud and offenses against public officials.   3. Enhanced Removal Procedures: The law aims to facilitate the removal of foreigners posing a serious threat to public order. Expulsion is possible for foreigners (even those with long-term residence or family ties in France) convicted of crimes or misdemeanors punishable by at least 3 or 5 years in prison, depending on the foreigner’s status, or involved in violence against elected officials or public agents. Protections against a mandatory departure order for some undocumented foreigners are removed. Foreign minors continue to be protected against mandatory departure orders. The law allows for residence assignments for up to 3 years (previously 1 year) for foreigners unable to leave France due to situations like war in their home country. Measures to facilitate the execution of removals include conditioning visa issuance on the proper delivery of consular passes by foreign states.   4. Asylum and Foreigners’ Litigation: The law plans the gradual deployment of territorial hubs called “France asylum,” replacing the current single reception points for asylum seekers. These hubs will centralize asylum seeker registration, rights initiation, and application processing. The National Court of Asylum Right’s organization is reformed, with the creation of territorial chambers and the generalization of the single judge. Asylum seekers posing a flight risk or a threat to public order can be assigned to residence or placed in detention under certain conditions. The litigation involving foreigners (accounting for 40% of administrative court activity) is simplified, reducing the number of standard contentious procedures from 12 to 3.   5. Measures Censored by the Constitutional Council: The Constitutional Council censored 32 articles for formal reasons (as “legislative riders” with insufficient connection to the initial text) and 3 articles on substantive grounds, including issues like immigration quotas, conditions for accessing certain benefits by foreigners, and the tightening of family reunification rules.